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Abstract: The several decades of totalitarian aggressive atheism have drastically changed the 
folk religion. In new political conditions this legacy remains very important, because it develops 
some typical features of contemporary religion-politics interrelation. The Orthodox religion became 
more and more linked with the political discourse. What was forbidden for a long period of decades 
out of a sudden became first official and then even obligatory, like atheism before. Some facts taken 
from Russian mass media of the nineties illustrate how the legacy of the Soviet past and the new 
popular version of Orthodoxy correlate with the politics.
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In this paper I will discuss some examples of relationship between folk religion 
and politics before, during and after the era of perestroika. I will also concentrate on 
the significance of the traditions and stereotypes in these links, exploring mainly the 
cases from my own experience.
It would be reasonable to start long before the crucial 1985, but it is impossible 
to do so in such a short talk. I will allow myself only to remember the fact that after 
long years of persecution of the church and the priesthood in Russia the very con-
cepts of folk religion and politics acquired a very specific nature. Even more specific 
and diverse was their correlation, particularly if we take into account such basic op-
positions as geographic (central-rural parts), ideological (strong-weak oppression of 
the officials), confessional (Christianity-Islam), sociological (communist bureauc- 
racy-“ordinary” people), national (Russia-other nationality), etc. The role of the 
individual (e.g. family background, personality) is very important in every single 
occasion. We can speak of the rural regions as the places where in spite of the op-
pression of the local authorities and the lack of churches, religion, folk beliefs and 
folk faith were saved and honoured in form of as we call it folk Orthodoxy. It was 
characteristic not only for Russians, but for other nationalities living in the USSR as 
well. I will give only one example from my field work of this period. In 1984 I took 
my students to the former Moldavian Republic where Moldavians, Ukrainians, Rus-
sians and Bulgarians lived in big villages. I chose one village, I have been to be-
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fore. I knew that the head of the local committee was my colleague, who had gradu-
ated from the Moscow State University, German Department. When I explained to 
him the purpose of our expedition (to put down archaic traditions, folklore, etc.) he 
said briefly: “We fight against all this, you won’t find anything interesting”. Embar-
rassed, I still started to interrogate the people and the very first woman (the village 
teacher) I met told me that they still performed many rituals (like asking for rain and 
many others) in spite of the ban of the local communists. The pagan rite for rain was 
frequently followed by a service, a prayer to which the whole village came. “At least 
several drops of rain would fall from the sky”, - concluded the teacher. Then I dis-
covered that folk beliefs were a still crucial part of life not only for the elder, but for 
the younger people as well, who knew the rituals in detail and took part in some of 
them. My colleague definitely knew it, being born and brought up in this village. But 
he also knew that the cultural anthropologists or ethnolinguists at that time were not 
allowed to study folk religion. The scholars could not use the terminology, even in 
such innocent subjects, like, let’s say folk calendar customs. The books on these top-
ics were very rare as well. (I will add in brackets that several years later this field of 
research became very popular and the demand for the books on religion and folk 
traditions is huge).
Hypocrisy was part of the Soviet politician’s attitude to religion and folk tradi-
tion. It is not surprising that there were (and still are) so many narratives describing 
how in a miraculous way atheists started to believe in God (Orthodox Miracles 1993, 
pp. 27-29). To be objective I have to add that there are many stories telling how 
communists started to believe in magic (like the evil eye, the importance of pagan 
commemorating acts, etc.). The canonical and folk Orthodoxy coexist even in depict-
ing the images of politicians (Big Communists, as they are called in the popular 
tradition, which was a synonym for atheists, the believers in communist principles 
and ideals).
The several decades of totalitarian aggressive atheism have failed to destroy the 
folk religion. The attempts of the politicians (leaders and ideologists of the Com-
munist Party) to create a new religion with new “saints”, rituals, values and formulae 
were succesful only for a limited period of time. By the 80s the ideological clichés 
and the new-speak in the nonofficial discourse were only used in numerous anec-
dotes and jokes.
We are still not able to adequately analyse the role of perestroika in all the 
spheres of the life of an individual and the country as a whole. The consequences of 
reconstruction embrace everything - not only the ideology, philosophy, politics and 
economics, art, but also the language, mentality, religiosity of the people, their eve-
ryday habits, etc. What is primary and what is secondary here, it is difficult to judge, 
but, I think, the most interesting thing is the interrelation of different areas during 
this period of time. Such an example is the correspondence between politics and 
religion. It is a very topical problem now, and not only for Russia, but for other for-
mer socialist states as well.
When perestroika started and freedom and democracy step by step penetrated 
into the society, one could observe several tendences which are still relevant. Infor-
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mation for a scholar was and still is everywhere - in the everyday life, in mass media, 
in church. The aggressive atheism of the officials gave place to religiosity. First of all, 
the revival of the Orthodox Church meant some material changes: opening of closed 
churches and monasteries,1 reconstruction of the ruined churches, creating of Sun-
day schools for children and adults, publishing of the Bible and all sorts of religious 
literature, etc. The Orthodox religion became more and more linked with the politi-
cal activity. What was forbidden for a long period of decades out of a sudden be-
came first official and then even obligatory. I will never forget my impression when I 
first saw the slogan in front of the Kremlin: “Merry Christmas” instead of “Happy 
New Year, Comrades”. It was a shock, which was doubled probably by the fact that 
in Russian “Merry Christmas” sounds not secularly, it definitely has some Church 
Slavonic characteristics (as you know the language of the Church is Slavonic, not 
modern Russian).
The physical presence of the religious practice at the end of the 80s became 
more and more perceptible. It could be compared to the Christianization of Russia 
by the scale. It was followed and supported by other tendencies in the society, for 
example the changing image of the mass media. Mass media which are tightly con-
nected with politics (both official and nonofficial) started to grow in their quantity 
and to differentiate in their content. Thus the language of the newspapers, maga-
zines, radio and TV diametrically changed. To speak on the faith, religiosity, on 
observance of celebrations, to quote the Bible became very popular. Sort of a fash-
ion was and still is to use quotations from the Holy Gospels in the advertisements - a 
new item for the post-Soviet reality. Again aiming at creating an image as attractive 
as possible, the copy-writers transform the sentences making the sense opposite 
(‘The last will be the first” - the slogan of a Russian bank, that disappeared after 
August, 17, 1998). The TV translation of liturgy, Easter service with comments be-
came ritual. The politicians also changed diametrically. Many of them gave up their 
atheism and became ‘pure’ Christians. At the very beginning when Eltsin, Luzhkov 
and others just started to appear in these programs holding a candle in the church 
some people very wittily called them “candlesticks”.
A very indicative part of the image of the modem Russian politicians is their re-
ligious practice. They do not think that the society cannot forget very quickly the 
atheistic position of the Communist Party, that the quotations from the New Testa-
ment in their speech cannot be perceived adequately. G. Zjuganov, General Secre-
tary of the Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, uses 
Christian allusions all the time, once in his interview on the radio he said: “Not the 
people, nor the God would understand and forgive us, if we take part in this dem-
onstration”. This tendency lasts, here is a very recent example: on the 14 of Septem-
ber (1999) after the explosions in Moscow the vice-president Gustov said on the 
radio: “I lighted a candle in the church, praying that Putin’s Cabinet would not be
1 Compare some statistics: the number of monasteries and nunneries has changed during the last 
decade from 18 to 400, the priesthood has doubled (Hie ro mon k  Ilari on  1999).
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disbanded”.2 To be a Christian is not only fashionable now (how it was at the begin-
ning of perestroika), it is a must for officials. That’s why all the public activity of our 
government (especially opening of the new banks, exhibitions, etc.) is often accom-
panied by the acts of consecration. Again, hypocrisy is part of the official policy in 
modern Russia, comparable to the behavior of their Soviet counterparts I described 
at the beginning.
These facts are on the surface. But there is something more specific which ties 
the politics with the religion and constitutes the political programmes of different 
parties. It is not characteristic for all the parties. A universal development of the 
concept of religion in the political discourse is the tight liaison of the religion with 
the ideas of nationalism and patriotism. Every day one can hear or read something 
which illustrates some of the points of this interrelation, especially now, when the 
election campaign started. Most interesting and objective facts can be found in the 
special publications of the “Russkaja Mysl” and “Nezavisimaja Gazeta”.
I will give only two extreme examples, taken from the recent articles in mass 
media. Russia of the future in the programs of Christian political parties is the Saint 
Russia, based on the East Orthodoxy. The mixture of ideas allows the commentators 
to talk of “political racist neopaganism’ (VERKHOVSKY 1999). One can find an in-
teresting confirmation of this idea in the program of the “Orthodox Russian Na-
tional Council”: “Orthodoxy is the state religion of Russia. Together with this a seri-
ous research of the Pre-Christian culture and religion should be undertaken. Thus 
we unite the spiritual values, which in the whole make national folk religion... The 
Orthodox religion is cluttered up, 60% of it is not Russian, it is alien” (Op. cit.).
Another example - rather funny now - the information on the sect, the members 
of which venerate Lenin as God and think of him as the second part of Christ. They 
call themselves Communist Party “Unity Vsevolod” - Union of all confessions, na-
tionalities and peoples, or cosmic communists. The specific feature of this movement 
is the idea of Lenin as Christ, but calling the two figures “two bases of the Universe, 
incarnations of principles ‘in’ and ‘jan’” undoubtedly shows that this mixture of reli-
gious terms and concepts is very typical for the state of mind of the people for at 
least the last fifteen years (SEROV 1999).
These two publications give a critical point of view, while hundreds of smaller 
newspapers, church booklets, etc. sometimes contain such ideas which have nothing 
to do with the Orthodox religion but pretend that their position is the only right one. 
This mixture of Christian faith and so to say pagan beliefs, superstitions is quite evi-
dent in our parishes nowadays. The neofits who come to the church bring over their 
spiritual background which is far away from the Orthodox faith. I have to recall that 
when the freedom came to Russia, the search for new spiritual values was so inten-
sive, and the lack of knowledge was so huge, that ordinary people reading thousands 
of publications just got lost. The old Russian folk beliefs (fortune-tellers, rituals,
2 This sentence could be understood only in the context of the political history of last year, when three 
Prime Ministers were dismissed one after another.
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everyday recommendations, demonology, weathercasts, etc.) often falsified could 
have been combined with whatever one can just think of - old Greek or Roman 
beliefs, Hindu rituals, esoteric ideas, etc. I remember once my elderly relative - 
woman in her 60s (baptized and active Russian Orthodox) called me and said that 
on that day at midnight I should fumigate the corners of the rooms. I said, Why? She 
answered that on the TV there was a program and that on this night people should 
venerate the Goddess Vesta, who helps the families to live in peace. Another thing 
from the spiritual practice of this woman is her visit to a healer who said to her that 
she was ill because of her sins. A priest was present there working together with the 
healer, so he read some prayers. “The healer told me I should come once more for a 
prayer and I will forget about my illness” - the lady went on. (The healer was an 
extrasense, as the Russians call them, they are very popular in Russia, there is a sort 
of cult of them and their abilities).
The mixture of magic and miracle can be observed everywhere. I was present in 
the church once when christening took place. I heard the lady who was preparing to 
become Godmother of a three-years old child saying: “Look at this man! (Actually, it 
was the priest.) He is holding light in his hands, some magic will happen now”3. We 
can find the same potpourri of words, symbols and beliefs in numerous advertise-
ments of the new Russian magicians, healers, fortune-tellers. Some of the texts are 
incredible, like “Peter Smirnov. Apostle and Bishop of Black Magic. Your beloved 
will crawl to you on his knees. 500% guarantee”. The cross, candles are in the neigh-
bourhood of the cup with the medical symbol (the snake), the emblem of the Rus-
sian Monarchy (the two-headed eagle) and so on and so forth.
Light was partly shed on this problem in some recent publications (Buzin  1999). 
The problem of contamination of Orthodoxy and paganism with sometimes dominat-
ing of the latter in the behavior of the parishioners is very serious now. One of the 
reasons for such a situation is that the parishioners do not understand the service, 
partly because of the archaic language, partly because people do not want to under-
stand it. Before, when the books, even the Bible were not available they would have 
an excuse. Then the folk notions would cover the Orthodox ideas.4 The border be-
tween folk tradition and Orthodox faith is very difficult to mark (and this is a long 
dispute already). Now the problem is of a different kind: the books and TV and ra-
dio programs on religion are so numerous, that to find the right way becomes diffi-
cult again. The books sold in the parishes which are supposed to educate the newly 
baptized contain information which is far away from the real faith - it is a sort of
3 In Russian the words for ‘magic’ and ‘miraculous’ are partly synonyms. They come from different 
discourse, the first one definitely is associated with folk tales and folklore in the whole, it cannot be used 
in the canonic texts about the saints, etc. If it is used, it has negative sense, opposed to Christianity as 
paganism.
4 We know this fact very well from our field research from the beginning of the 80s. The situation has 
not changed by now. Folk Orthodoxy has its own concepts, it can be very firm in some ideas, which com-
pare or even mix personages, like Eve and Mary, Christ and Nicholas, etc. (it is universal, compare the 
Bulgarian data - Badal anov a  1999). The folk tradition ascribes some relations to the saints, as, for 
example, I was told by an old Russian Christian lady, bom in a village close to Moscow, that Saint Nicho-
las is the Father of Jesus Christ, and many other examples in our archives.
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Strange superstitions of modern times. For example a series of books “Give me an 
advice, Father” discusses whether a priest is allowed to drive a car or to go to the 
swimming pool. The answer is “No”. Another open public discussion which started 
in July-August in Russia, was whether it was sinful to have a dog as a pet at home.
To my surprise I found the practising Orthodoxy and folk faith in their total 
mixture at a very sad occasion, when my aunt died. We called an agent, who showed 
himself well-prepared from the point of view of the church and folk traditions. He 
was absolutely sure in his statements (by the way the lack of hesitating, the typical 
Soviet desire to teach everybody and everywhere still exist in our country). He knew 
everything in detail. He even could foresee his clients’ political preferences. When 
choosing the colour of the coffin (there were two colours - blue and red) he tried to 
help us asking “what are the colours for the newly-born boys and girls?” When he 
saw that we were still choosing, he said: “Don’t hesitate, red does not mean the 
Communist in the funeral. The communists do not bury their comrades in red cof-
fins”. This case deserves a special analysis, due to the unbelievable chaotic contami-
nation of the information taken from different world religions, but I will stop here 
because of lack of time.
To conclude I want to underline that in spite of the new conditions in our coun-
try (democracy, revival of the church, change of values, etc.) some stereotypes still 
work. The mass religion is very pragmatic, almost pagan in its essence, it does not 
presuppose Faith, or obedience, or observance of the Commandments. The mixture 
of concepts is widely used by the politicians who aim in their programs at exploiting 
the Orthodoxy in the form it exists in modern Russia.
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